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COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
LABORATORY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
AUTOMATIC REACTIONS.
BY DR. LEON M. SOLOMONS,
University of Wisconsin.
The experiments upon the time of automatic reactions, of
which I wish to give a brief account here, are an outgrowth in
part of the work on Motor Automatism published by Miss Stein
and myself in the REVIEW for September, 1896. I had three
main objects—to see whether the various stages of automatism
which we there distinguished had characteristic reaction times;
to get evidence, if possible, for the theory advanced in that
article, that the feeling of personal agency accompanying a
movement is due primarily to the motor neurons of the cortex—
that is, that it is the absence of their activity which gives a
movement its feeling of impersonality; and third, to attack the
problem of the relation of attention to the different types of
reaction by studying reactions in which attention was totally
absent.
The experiments are not complete, and their evidence is not
as clear and convincing as it might, I believe, be made. But
since it is doubtful whether I shall be able to continue them in
the near future, and especially since some of the indications
may prove valuable suggestions to other workers in the field, I
think it advisable to give at least a preliminary account now.
GENERAL METHOD. The mode of distraction adopted was
the same as in the experiments on motor automatism—the read-
ing of light, entertaining literature. The stimulus was the
sound of an electric hammer. During part of the experiments
the Scripture reaction key was used. During the last part this
was changed, since some of the subjects found difficulty in
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maintaining the contact between reactions without interfering
with the complete automatism of the movement. I accordingly
changed to an Ewald key, but used a contact through mer-
cury instead of the simple metallic contact. With this key
a considerable unconscious pressure might be exerted by the
subject upon the key without breaking the connection, and yet
the reaction require no special effort. The mercury contact
had only a very slight immersion—never more than ^V of an
inch—and did not, I believe, appreciably affect the reaction
time, while it was of considerable assistance in maintaining con-
nections during the intervals between the reactions.
The chronoscope—placed in a separate room to prevent the
subject knowing when an observation was to be made—was
connected in the usual way, the stimulus closing the circuit, and
the breaking of the contact by the reaction opening it. Find-
ing it difficult to maintain an adjustment of the fall hammer
constant over long periods of time, recourse was had to a pendu-
lum control. This had the disadvantage that the time of the
control was greater than that of the reactions studied. But as
relative values only were desired, this was no real difficulty,
while the greater certainty of constancy of conditions from
month to month was a distinct gain.
The subject was instructed to keep his attention as closely
as possible upon what he was reading, and not to think of the
experiment. He was asked to introspect as carefully as cir-
cumstances permitted, but not so as to interfere with the autom-
atism. The subjects differed considerably in the ease with
which they acquired the ability to react automatical^, but the
stages seemed to be the same in all.
At first the attention is all on the experiment, the subject
reading without understanding. Gradually the incidence of at-
tention shifts, and he is able to keep his mind on his reading
between reactions, but has to stop reading to react. The inter-
ference produced by this reaction becomes less and less, until
the various stages of automatism are reached and passed
through. Some subjects become automatic after very little
practice; others require a good deal, and their results are more
valuable for the light the}' throw on the passage from .voluntar}-
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to automatic reactions, than for the passage from simple auto-
matic to subconsciousness.
At first the reaction times were studied by the usual method
of taking the average, corrected if necessary by throwing out
those with very large residuals. But during this process it was
observed that the small residuals were not, as they should be,
in the majority ; but that often, on the contrary, there were a
large number of large residuals of about the same value, with
few, if any, small ones. This showed that the average was
simply a mean between two reaction times of different value,
and, therefore, thoroughly misleading. Accordingly I adopted
the method of plotting the reactions, as one plots an error curve.
The resulting curve is, of course, of the same form as would be
obtained by plotting the residuals, the position of the Y axis
alone being changed.
The curves so obtained did not in general assume the form
of the theoretical error curve, but showed a grouping of the re-
actions about several points. It had been my intention to study
the effect of frequency, intensity of stimulus, etc., on the reac-
tion times, and I had arranged my apparatus with that end.
But finding the problem complicated by the reactions being of
mixed types, I thought it best to confine myself to my main
problem.
Owing to the uncertainty of the last figure of a reaction time
obtained in thousandths of a second, I plotted the curves, during
the course of the experiments, for hundredths of a second only.
Becoming satisfied, however, that this method failed to bring out
some important features of the reactions, I commenced a more
minute study, with various methods of plotting. A comparison
of these results convinced me that the best method for these re-
sults was to let the ordinate corresponding to any time repre-
sent the number of reactions having a value within 2 a of that
time. This gives a curve the main features of which may be
seen at a glance, but which is, nevertheless, not misleadingly
simple.
It will be seen in the following discussion that I do not place
much reliance upon the lesser variations in the curves. They
<t.-e probably important, but the chronoscope is too inaccurate an
i .strument to warrant reliance upon them.
HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY 379
T H E TYPES OF REACTION.—My subjects, eight in number,
may be divided into three groups. Group one, consisting of
subjects G, B and D, required long practice before becoming
thoroughly automatic. They tended toward the auditor)' type.
That is, their thought is largely in sound terms, and their atten-
tion is readily attracted and held by sounds. The subject G
sometimes distracted himself by thinking of music he had heard.
Group two, consisting of subjects M, S, and De, were of the
visual motor type. The)' could not recall sounds at all. Their
imagery was all visual and motor. These subjects readily be-
came automatic and passed through all the stages of automatism.
•Group three, consisting of subjects Ho and Ha, were inter-
mediate. They were poor visualizers, but their motor and audi-
tory memories were good. They occupied an intermediate posi-
tion as regards automatism. They found it difficult to keep the
attention from wandering to the experiment. Their automatism,
while in general apparently very good, was easily disturbed.
These two subjects experienced the most difficulty in maintain-
ing the contact during the intervals between the reactions.
Whether the correlation here appearing between the types of
imagery and the tendency to automatism is accidental or signifi-
cant, remains to be seen.
Fig. 1 presents a series of curves obtained from the subject
G. Each curve, except the first, represents the results of re-
actions taken at one sitting. The abscissa gives the time
of the reaction; the ordinate, the number of reactions having
that time, or coming within 10 of it. The curves are arranged
in time order, beginning at the bottom, and illustrate the progress
of automatism. The subject G did not in general react auto-
matically. He found it difficult to keep his attention away from
the experiment, and when he did the reactions were often vol-
untary. That is, he had to turn his attention to the experiment
when the stimulus came in order to react. He eventually be-
came fairly automatic, however. His imagery is auditory and
visual.
A glance at the curves shows immediately this characteristic.
There are a large number of comparatively quick reactions in
the earlier ones, then long reactions predominate, and then short
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FIG. 5.—This curve shows the distribution of 518 reactions taken from 5
different subjects.
ones again. All the subjects showed this peculiarit}-. The
reason is that at first the attention is on the experiment, and the
subject in a condition of expectation, and we therefore have
something near the conditions of the ordinary simple reaction.
Later he learns to keep his attention off the experiment, and the
reactions are slow. Then the path gets worn smooth by habit,
and the various stages of automatism commence, ending in a
very quick reaction.
The subject's notes amply confirm this explanation, if con-
firmation is necessary. G notes for the first curve, which rep-
resents the results of three days' observations during November,
that his attention was more or less on the experiment all the
time.
For Jan. 19 we have the note, " Attention somewhat on ex-
periment, but not enough to give any realty voluntary reactions.
No very fast ones, as when attention is on reaction ; nor any
very slow ones, as when I do not react and then recollect my-
self." The results of self-observation are amply confirmed by
the curve.
Feb. 25 the reactions were judged to be about ' in between
voluntary and automatic' On Mar. 25 the automatism is con-
sidered fair, and on Apr. 15 'more automatic than usual.'
On May 20 the automatism was judged to be very good, and he
expressed a doubt as to whether he heard the stimulus distinctly
before he felt the reaction.
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It will be noticed that during the period between the reac-
tions in which the attention was on the experiment, and the ap-
pearance of good automatism, the bulk of the reactions are
above 2goa. After automatism sets in the bulk of the reactions
are below 290*7, and on May 20, when for the first time a doubt
appears as to there being a distinct interval between stimulus
and reaction, there are a large number below 2301T. The re-
sults from other subjects show that these peculiarities are
significant.
Fig. 2 shows a similar series of curves from the subject D.
Like G, the usual imagery of D is auditory and visual. She
became automatic much more quickly, however, though remain-
ing for a long time in the first stage. The first move represents
the result of the first day's experimenting. She had very little
difficulty in keeping her attention off the experiment, and after
a very little practice the reactions ceased to disturb her reading.
Nevertheless, it will be noticed that even in her case we have a
greater preponderance of short reactions in the first curve. The
next curve shown is for Mar. 2. Her report was 'Attention
first attracted by sound, reaction automatic' The next curve
shown is for March 10. The number of reactions below 230*7
is now at a minimum. She reported the reactions as seeming
'perfectly regular and automatic.' She always heard the stim-
ulus first, and then the reaction followed, without an interval
between, or any movement of attention, or effort. March 17
she was asked to compare the interval between the sound and
the reaction, with that between the reaction and the click made
by the key on striking. She found it difficult, but thought the
second interval rather longer.
On March 25 I began giving the stimuli more frequently—
ever}' 7 y2 seconds on an average, instead of every 15. The
subject's judgment was that the greater frequency increased the
automatism. In one sense this is apparently true. It should be
noticed though that in her case, as in that of G, the introduction
of the more frequent stimuli is marked by an increase in the
number of short reactions greater than that of subsequent dates.
I am inclined to believe, therefore, though they did not notice it
themselves, that the greater frequency at first had the effect of
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drawing their attention to the experiment a little, and that this
effect passed away later.
On April 14 she notes that in one place the reaction and the
stimulus seemed simultaneous, and that some of the reactions
seemed 'impersonal.' It will be noticed that corresponding to
this note we have a large number of reactions below 230, and
several in fact below 180. Impersonality was never noted by
her again, though on May 25 she again observed some reac-
tions in which stimulus and reaction seemed ' almost simul-
taneous.'
It is to be noticed that D's reactions were nearly always be-
low 290. The long period in which the reactions were above
this, shown by G, is absent in her case, owing apparently, to
the almost immediate occurrence of automatism. The subject
B, the third of this type, gave results similar to G. She was
a long time in becoming automatic according to her report, and
her reactions showed a majority above 290(7 for a long time.
With D as with G, further, ' simultaneous' reactions were
noted with the reappearance in number of reactions below 230.
The indications from these three subjects are, then, that the
reaction time for automatic response to sounds begins somewhere
in the neighborhood of 290. A reaction time longer than this
indicates that some effort of attention or will is necessary. There
is no change in this subjective condition until we reach a
region below 230(7, when apparently a new type of automatic re-
action begins. To study this other type we must turn to the
records from other subjects. The exact limits of the first type,
as well as the significance of the different groups of reactions
indicated by the curve within this general type, had best be con-
sidered later.
As to the character of this group of subjects, supposing that
it does represent a type of person, there is not, I think, any good
reason for thinking the difference between them and others
other than one of degree. With time and proper methods they
will, I believe, pass through all the phases of automatism. I
made no special effort to hurry them, for I was more than will-
ing that some of my subjects should remain in this phase, for
its better study. Instead of trying to adapt the conditions of
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the experiment to the habits of attention of the subject, I made
them the same for all subjects. Naturally the differing habits
of attention resulted in differing responses upon the part of the
subjects. As the practice was infrequent—I had none of my
subjects oftener than twice a week—these individual differences
had free scope.
Group 2, Fig. 3 shows a series of curves obtained from
M. M is of the visual motor type. The first curve, March 2d,
shows results of the first da}'. He reported no trouble in read-
ing during the reaction, but an undercurrent of attention on ex-
periment. His attention was attracted first by the stimulus.
The stimulus and the reaction sometimes seemed simultaneous.
The time between the stimulus and the reaction usually seemed
shorter than that between the reaction and the second click.
On March 9 he reports his reactions rather regular. The
stimulus comes distinctly first, then his feeling of reacting, then
the sound marking the completion of the reacting. On March
16th, for the first time, some of the reactions seem impersonal.
In these impersonal reactions the second interval, that between
the feeling of reacting—a muscular feeling in arm or finger—
and the sound made by the key, seemed shorter than the first
interval. In a few reactions he can recognize the stimulus be-
fore the reaction, but in many he doubts whether he would
know the order of events but for former experiences. OH
March 30th nearly all the reactions feel impersonal. The whole
interval between the two sounds seems shorter, but the interval
between the stimulus and the reaction feeling is about the same
as that between the reaction and the second click. On April 6 the
reactions are still impersonal. He gets the stimulus by a memory
after-image. The reaction first attracts his attention, and then
he is aware of the whole thing at once, though in the totality
thus present the stimulus stems to be first. It seems to be a
•* succession of things all at once.' In the latter part of the ex-
periment the reaction was sometimes all over before he knew it,
and the whole thing came as a sort of memory after-image.
May 11, 'sometimes the attention is first attracted by a funny
feeling marking the completion of the reaction, a restless nerv-
ous feeling. On May 18 he reported a curious feeling which
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was also noticed frequently by S. He knows the stimulus has
come before he really hears it. It is a perfect imitation of an
hysterical an&'sthesia with ' clairvoyant' tendencies. The ex-
planation is, presumably, that the sensory nerve current passes
over into a reaction before rousing its usual response in the
auditoiy centers of the cortex. The reactions on this occasion
were only partly impersonal. They were frequently entirely
over before he knew anything about it. On May 25th this
characteristic was still more marked, being almost unconscious
toward the end. The reactions were only in part impersonal.
In some cases the stimulus and the reaction seemed all one; in
other cases the reaction was almost simultaneous with the second
click.
It will be noticed in this case that impersonal reactions do
not appear until we have reactions below i8o<7; that they are
not judged to be nearly all impersonal until the great majority
are below this point; and that when this ceases to be the case
the reactions are again onl}- in part impersonal.
Further, it will be noticed that the first type of simple auto-
matic reaction that predominated in the reactions of D and G—
that is, a personal reaction with the stimulus coming distinctly
and clearly first—is not noted after March 9th, when reactions
above 2300- cease to be prominent. The indications then agree
with those obtained from D and G. • The first t}'pe of automatic
reaction stops at about 23KT. The impersonal reactions begin
below I8O<T. How about the interval? The reactions between
180 and 230 are sometimes characterized by ' simultaneous re-
actions,' but not always. When they first occur they have this
peculiarity. Afterward, though they are very distinct from
both the impersonal and the simple automatic, the}r are difficult to
describe. The subject M, it will be noted, only observed really
simultaneous reactions once, thoagh throughout the experi-
ments he noted reactions not belonging to the other types. D,
another subject of this group, only experimented once. Like
M, he became automatic very quickly. He reported many
'simultaneous reactions.' The other subject belonging to this
group, the writer, S, had a similar experience. I noticed
simultaneous reactions very frequently at first—over a longer
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period than M and De, but relatively short—but very seldom
afterward. On two occasions this simultaneity was so marked
and striking that I stopped the experiment to find out the record.
Both showed reactions of 209*7. In general it is not possible to
get a judgment of the character of an isolated reaction—one
can only get a general impression of a number. Nevertheless,
though absolute simultaneity is not frequent, reactions which
feel very similar to these are frequent and perfectly distinct.
They are the quickest feeling reactions—unless we judge the
time by the interval between the two clicks. The}' are char-
acterized by uncertainty about the order of events, and a general
predominance in the mass of feelings composing the total reac-
tion—stimulus, movement, etc.—of the muscular and innervation
feelings. Before passing to the general discussion' of the re-
sults, however, it will be worth while to consider briefly the third
group.
Fig. 4 gives a few curves from the subject Ho. Ho is a
poor visualizer, but has a good auditory and motor memory.
He was rather erratic in his reactions, sometimes being very
automatic, and at other times not so. The first curve shown is
for February 24th. By that time he had settled down to greater
regularity. He notes that his attention is first attracted by the
reaction. Also, that throughout the experiment there is a
slight feeling of tension in the arm. For March 4th he notes
some impersonality. March n t h , sometimes simultaneous,
sometimes impersonal. On March 23d, " Not as automatic as
usual condition of expectation. Some simultaneous, very few
impersonal. Second interval most marked." On March 23d the
more rapid stimuli—every 7 ^ seconds—were first introduced.
With Ho, as with the others, their first introduction is marked
by a preponderance of shorter reactions. But Ho notes a dis-
' turbance of the automatism, which the others did not. I be-
lieve the explanation is the same in all cases, but that only in
Ho was the disturbance great enough to be noticed. In this
case, whenever the shortness of the reaction is due to atten-
tion being on the experiment, the short reactions do not feel
itnpersonal. Simultaneous reactions are, however, noted,
though there are but two or three reactions within the interval
where they usually occur. Both facts are, I believe, significant-
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The last reactions are noted as very impersonal. The first
interval seems the longer.
Perhaps the most important thing in these reactions is the
indication of a fourth type of reaction below 130. The subjec-
tive conditions corresponding to these low reactions do not seem
to differ much from those of the third type. They are, per-
haps, a little more strikingly impersonal, and the second inter-
val is still shorter. But these differences might appear in the
third type after practice had worn its path smooth and the sub-
ject had grown more accustomed to its observation. I am in-
clined to think, therefore, that the difference between the paths
indicated by these two groups of reactions does not involve any
difference in consciousness; that the change is entirely in the
lower centers.
GENERAL DISCUSSION.—Until the facts are more clearhr es-
tablished I do not feel justified in taking up the time of the
readers of the REVIEW with a full discussion of their signifi-
cance, for this would involve the presentation and examination
of a much larger number of curves, a very tedious discussion,
and, in the end, still much doubt and uncertainty. This would
be worth while only if no more conclusive evidence could be
obtained. But as I believe that more extensive experiments
will save this, the proper course seems to be to give only a brief
statement of the most general conclusions to which the experi-
ments have led me.
Above 290(7 we have reactions in which some element of
will appears. In the slowest there is an idea of the movement
about to be made. In those nearer to 3000- there seems to be no
idea between the stimulus and the reaction—nothing but a feel-
ing of voluntariness, of somehow willing what takes place.
This is not the feeling of effort mentioned as one of the elements
of a sensory motor reaction in my paper on ' Normal Motor
Automatism." The feeling of effort does not appear in these
simple movements, unless the subject gets tired. It is rather a
portion of what we called the ' motor impulse,' and described
as " a melange of visual and kinassthetic material, as well as
other elements not easily described, and, perhaps, really a direct
1
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consciousness of a motor current." The results of these reaction
experiments permit, I think, a somewhat closer analysis of this
motor impulse and the stages of its disappearance. The ' visual
and kinaesthetic material ' seems to disappear first, and then this
peculiar will feeling. My chief evidence for this view is the
statement of the subject G, on days when his reactions were
largely between 280 and 340, that between the stimulus and the
reaction there were ' feelings,' but no ideas or readily describ-
able reactions.
Below 29CXT we have nothing left of the motor impulse ex-
cept the feeling of personal activity. In the typical reaction of
this class the subject is resting quietly, when his attention is sud-
denly attracted by a sound—or, rather, he suddenly hears a
sound, for there is no conscious movement of attention. Immedi-
ately after he feels himself react. Then he hears a click tell-
ing him that the key has been pressed down. During all this
time he has gone on with his reading undisturbed. He is con-
scious of what has happened, but that is all. These reactions
seem to correspond to the usual ' sensory reaction.'
The next type, from about 175 to about 225, is characterized
by the prominence -of the reaction feeling. When reactions of
this type first appear their distinguishing feature is the simul-
taneity of the stimulus and the reaction. The subject's attention
being fully on his reading, he is aware at once of a sound and a
movement. He finds himself pressing a key at the same time
that he hears a sound. Later he does not really hear the sound
at the same time as he reacts. He is suddenly conscious of
reacting, and later of two sounds. Of these sounds, the one
seems to be a memory after-image of a sound made before the
reaction, the other to be the sensation of a sound coming after
the reaction. The explanation of this change seems to me to
be this: In the first t\'pe the sensory current goes first to the
auditory centers, where it awakens a response, and then to the
centers, whatever they are, whose activity gives the reaction
feeling, or the beginning of the reaction feeling, and then out
to the muscles. In this second type the sensory current divides,
part going direct to the reaction center, part to the auditory
center, and rousing both to activity at about the same time. As
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the new path gets worn less stimulus goes to the auditory centers,
and they respond only after some time. To put it another way,
with the establishment of the shorter path the attention gets
more complete^ away from sounds. Now, whenever we fail to
hear a sound immediately, and later turn our attention to it, we
get it by a sort of memory after-image. This memory after-
image has peculiarities of its own which enable us, or cause us,
to apperceive it as such, and project it into its proper time rela-
tions, or what knowledge and habit would indicate to be its
proper time relations. Thus, though the reaction is the first
thing to come into consciousness, we apperceive the whole group
of stimulus (perceived by memory after-image), reaction feeling
and final click, according to previous experience and our
knowledge of the particular circumstances. This view of the
relation between the two types is in entire accord with the fact
that subjects with active and sensitive auditory centers remain
so much longer in the first stage than those whose motor centers
are the more active.
In the third stage, the impersonal reaction, the last element
of the motor impulse, has disappeared. In this t}-pe the reaction
feeling is followed very quickly, if not accompanied, by the final
click. Sometimes the subject heard the stimulus very distinctly
before the reaction. Sometimes he is first conscious of the re-
action, and gets the stimulus by a memory after-image;—but
there is no doubt in his mind that the stimulus came before the
reaction. What is the meaning of these observations? What
has happened when the reaction becomes impersonal? The
shorter interval between the reaction feeling and the final click,
as well as the longer interval between the stimulus and the re-
action feeling, seem to demand one, and only one, explanation.
In the previous types the beginning of the reaction feeling was
an activity in the cortex. In this the reaction feeling is purely
a sensation from the muscles of the hand and arm. The sen-
sory current must now go over into a motor reaction through the
lower centers entirely, or, at any rate, without awakening any
response upon the part of the cortex. To this extent then I be-
lieve that the theory advanced by Miss Stein and myself as to
the origin of the feeling of personality is fully confirmed by
HARVARD PSYCHOLOGICAL LABORATORY. 391
these experiments. The reaction becomes impersonal when the
last center that contributes anything to consciousness drops out
of the sensory motor path, and this center contributes nothing
but this feeling of personality.
When we come to inquire more carefully into the identity' of
this center difficulties arise. The reaction feeling is the same
in the impersonal and the personal reactions. It has changed
nothing but its orientation, so to speak. It is felt in a different
relation to the personality and the slimulus. The sensations are
the same. How is it then that in the personal reactions the
whole reaction feeling is timed bv the part of it which simply
gives its personal coloring? This fact suggests the view that
this last center, which gives the personal relation, is a kinaesthetic
center, and includes a feeling of the reaction identical with that
furnished by return sensations alone. But this view in turn has,
it seems to me, grave difficulties. All the kinaesthetic part of
the sensor}- motor path seemed to have dropped out before the
first stage of automatism. Moreover, in the personal reaction
one is not conscious of both the reaction feeling and the return
sensations. It is necessary, therefore, to suppose that the two
fuse, though occurring successively., But if we admit that nerv-
ous disturbances separated by such an interval of time may fuse
into one presentation, the necessity for supposing the center giv-
ing the personal feeling to be kinaisthetic ceases. The most
natural supposition, then, seems to be that it is a motor center:
and that its activity gives the personal feeling to the sensations
that follow. I do not mean that the activity of the motor cen-
ters gives a consciousness of personality' alone. The feeling
that one has reacted is not a feeling of personal activity plus a
muscular feeling. It should rather be said that •when the sensa-
tions from an arm movement arc -preceded by a discharge of
the corrcspojidmg motor cells of the cortex they arc felt to be
•personal. The activity of the motor cells is thus responsible
for the resulting state of consciousness taking this form. The
impersonality of the reaction, or its personality, as the case may
be, is not part of the reaction feeling, but a peculiarity of the
whole state of consciousness in which the reaction feeling is rep-
resented in all its relations to the stimulus and the second click,
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and to the reaction. It is this characteristic of the whole state
of consciousness that is determined by the presence or absence
of the activity of the motor cells.
As to the fourth group of reactions, if it exists, it must corre-
spond to a still shorter path. The neuron whose dropping out
marks the difference between this group and the preceding
apparently furnishes nothing to consciousness, and is pre-
sumably outside the cortex. On the other hand, though,
should it be thought that the feeling of personality comes from
a kinazsthetic center, and that this is anatomically distinct
from the motor zones of the cortex, the way is open to regard
the fourth type as the first purely ' extra-cortical.' In the
present state of our knowledge of the finer anatomy of this sen-
sory motor path and the meagerness of these experiments it
would be unprofitable to discuss further the correlation of the
different types of reaction with known sensori-motor paths.
As to the third question, the relation of attention to reaction
time, these experiments show that all types of reaction are pos-
sible without the attention being on any part of the reaction—
in so far, that is, as we take the length of a reaction as an index
of its type. They further indicate that the will has nothing
to do with the ord ina l reaction, its function being confined,
after a little practice, to placing the sensori-motor path in a
condition favorable to rapid reaction. The muscular reaction
is practically a reflex—as the Leipsic school contend—and the
sensory reaction is at least automatic.
Professor Angell's1 view that the ultimate effect of practice
is to reduce both types of reaction to the same time, seems to me
to be confirmed by these experiments. Professor Baldwin's
view, that the subject's habits of attention, as reflected in his usual
imagery, is an important factor in determining his behavior in
reaction experiments, seems also to be in accord, though my ex-
periments do not throw any light on the more specific sugges-
tions made by him as to the exact way in which these habits
influence the simple reaction.2
My observations on the earlier reactions, when the subject's
1
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1
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attention was still in part on the experiment, would lead me to
believe that the principal effect of attention in this case is to
bring the entire motor mechanism into a condition of heightened
sensitivity. As a result, when the stimulus comes, all the paths,
or many of them, are used. The reaction time is, of course, the
time of the fastest: but the current also traverses the others.
On this account the reactions never feel impersonal, but do very
often feel «simultaneous.' The motor cells always respond
before the return sensations from the reflex reaction have arrived,
and give the reaction a personal feeling, even though, in fact, it
is reflex. But the division of the current between the paths of
the first and the second type is the most favorable condition
for ' simultaneity.'
Before closing, a few words ma}' be said concerning the
smaller groupings shown by the curves. Though in the curve
representing a single day's reactions it is to be expected that
some of these groups are mere matters of chance, this explana-
tion will not hold for large numbers of reactions. In fact, a
glance at the curves will show a great deal of uniformity in
this respect, showing that even as few as thirty or forty reac-
tions will give reliable groupings. Especially is the location of
certain of the minima very constant from day to day. Appar-
ently the changes in reaction time due to practice, and even the
differences between one individual and another, are due pri-
marily, if not wholly, to the relative preponderance of different
groups, rather than to change in the time corresponding to the
same group.
Fig. 5 shows a curve obtained from the reactions of five
different subjects, during two weeks in May. I select this period
because both subjects and apparatus were fairly constant in their
behavior throughout it. It will be seen that the groupings are
by no means destroyed by this combination of the results from
several subjects and on several different occasions. More hetero-
geneous selections of results also continue to show the grouping
in a very marked manner, but not so satisfactorily as this.
It will be noticed that much of the grouping shows a large
group separated from its neighbors by deep minima, which is di-
vided in turn into two groups, separated by a much slighter
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minimum. This smaller grouping I do not consider reliable, as
it may be largely due to the chronoscope. The larger group-
ings can hardly be so explained, and since they are not marked
by differences in consciousness they presumably represent dif-
ferences in the sensori-motor path outside of the cortex. The
detailed discussion of this subject, however, I reserve until I
can present fuller and more exact results.
In concluding, I wish to express my thanks to Professor
Munsterberg and to my fellow-students in the Harvard Labora-
tory, for cordial cooperation and assistance.
